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Research Question / Issue: This paper studies the effect of corporate governance on 
value creation for listed companies. It also examines whether the fact that a business is 
owned or partly owned by a family has an impact on this variable as well as the 
behavior of companies at different stages of the economic cycle. 
Research Findings / Insights: Our research makes use of a dataset consisting of the 
companies in the IBEX-35 for the period 2005/12. It carries out a sub-analysis for the 
periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2012, to evaluate the effect of the crisis. The results 
indicate that neither the presence of women on boards of directors nor family ownership 
affect value creation in the companies analyzed. The size of the entity revealed a 
statistically significant and negative coefficient for the entire period under analysis. 
However, recorded profitability revealed a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient only for the pre-crisis period and not for the later period. In contrast, board 
size and the percentage of independent board members are both relevant and reveal a 
positive coefficient for the crisis period. 
Theoretical / Academic Implications: Although its starting point is agency theory, 
complemented by resource dependence theory, the paper resorts to the sociological 
theory of the strength of weak ties, to explain its results. Gender diversity and family 
ownership do not seem to have an impact on value creation, while the level of 
independence of the governance bodies has a positive effect throughout the crisis 
period. This result supports the notion that board structure is much more relevant in 
difficult and challenging times. In addition to increasing the number of independent 
directors, it is also crucial that a minimum percentage be reached in order to influence 
the board and generate value. 
Practitioner / Policy Implications: According to the empirical evidence, in times of 
crisis, it seems advisable and more efficient to increase board size with more 
independent directors, regardless of gender. Gender equality does not harm value 
creation. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Value Creation, Executive Committee, Board 
composition, Director independence 
JEL CODES: G32, G34, H11 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature on the relationship between corporate governance and value creation has 
expanded in recent years
i
. Most of this research is based on three classic theoretical 
paradigms analyzed by Nicholson and Kiel (2007): agency theory, stewardship theory, 
and resource dependence theory. Furthermore, research on corporate governance has 
also been enriched by new perspectives. In particular, Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni and 
Vigano (2011) point out three additional approaches: (1) Dismantle fortresses:  based on 
a team production approach, it builds up agency theory to refocus on multi-theoretical 
approaches integrating micro and macro theories (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003); 
(2) Context, behavior and evolution:  this approach also takes agency theory as its main 
theory, refocusing it on behavioral theories (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004); (3) 
Behavioral perspectives: perspectives based on economic and legal approaches 
redirected to theories about power, social and organization psychology (Hambrick, van 
Werder and Zajac, 2008). 
In this paper, we adopt an interdisciplinary approach and draw from three important 
theories taken from economics and sociology: agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and the theory of The 
strength of the weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). 
Agency theory is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict between the 
interests of a firm’s owners and its management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As to the 
mechanism by which a board is expected to influence corporate performance, agency 
theory suggests that a greater proportion of outside/independent directors will be able to 
monitor any self-interested actions by managers. Such monitoring will provide less 
opportunity for managers to pursue self-interest at the expense of owners (lower agency 
costs), so shareholders will enjoy greater returns (or increased profits).  
 
Whereas agency theory is appropriate for conceptualizing the control/monitoring role of 
directors, additional theoretical perspectives are needed to explain directors’ resource, 
service, and strategic roles (Daily, Dalton and Canella, 2003). Resource dependence 
theory provides a theoretical foundation for directors’ resource role. Proponents of this 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) suggest four primary benefits for the external 
linkages: (1) provision of resources such as information and expertise; (2) creation of 
channels of communication with constituents of importance to the firm; (3) provision of 
commitments for support from important external organizations or groups; and (4) 
creation of legitimacy for the firm in the external environment (cited in Carter, D’Souza, 
Simkins and Simpson, 2010: 398). 
  
Finally, Gabrielssson and Huse (2004) assume that the behavior and conduct of 
directors can be successfully inferred from the board’s demographic characteristics. 
Following these authors, we turn to the sociological theory of the strengh of the weak 
ties. Granovetter believes that to establish links that can really have an influence on the 
group (in our case, on the Board of Directors), there must be a minimum of actors. A 
minimum number and percentage of independent members is required to influence  
value creation; such independent directors must have ties that allow them to exercise an 
influence on the board, and must be united by the common goal of making the most 
effective decisions. This theory allows us to understand the relevance of the personal 
characteristics of the independent directors and their influence on the group dynamics of 
the board; minority group members may encourage divergent thinking in the decision-
making process. 
The evolution of the literature that examines the relationship between corporate 
governance and value creation has been influenced by the drafting of codes of good 
governance throughout the world (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). All of them recommend 
greater independence and gender diversity on boards. 
The relationship between gender diversity and corporate governance has also been 
widely studied. In Europe, in addition to codes of good governance, there have been 
several legislative proposals aiming to increase the number of women on boards. The 
literature shows different results in the relationship between value creation and diversity 
in several countries.  
The effect of family ownership on value creation has also been extensively discussed in 
the literature, with varying results. Although most studies conclude that family 
ownership positively affects the generation of value, in others there is negative or no 
significant relation.  
The so-called “great recession” that started in 2007 offers a good opportunity to test the 
influence of corporate governance on value creation in different scenarios. Our main 
hypothesis is that the effects of the composition and structure of governance structures, 
captured by the number of independent directors, board size, the representation of 
women, and family ownership of the company are amplified in times of crisis. The idea 
is very simple: the board of directors is much less relevant when market conditions are 
favorable. When they are not, the board is crucial to explain differences in value 
creation.  
For this purpose, we carry out an econometric study using time-series cross-section data 
for listed companies in the IBEX-35 over the period 2005-2012. The results confirm the 
idea that board structure is much more relevant in difficult and challenging times. In 
addition to increasing the number of independent directors, it is also crucial that a 
minimum percentage be reached in order to influence the board and generate value. 
Conversely, gender effects and family ownership do not matter.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature to 
determine the relationship between the different variables and the process of value 
creation and establishes several hypotheses. The third section describes the data and 
construction of the variables. The fourth section presents empirical results and 
interpretations. Finally, we draw conclusions and discuss implications. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES  
Corporate governance and value creation 
A significant number of studies have tried to determine the impact of different decisions 
on corporate governance in companies from different markets. These papers analyze to 
what extent compliance with good governance recommendations affects business results 
and, therefore, the creation of value. They find that: implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in the U.S. has a positive impact on the value of the companies; introduction 
of the Peters Committee recommendations caused no significant changes in the value of 
companies in the Netherlands; the degree of compliance with the German code of good 
governance is relevant information valued by the market; there is no significant 
relationship between total compliance with the recommendations of the Cadbury 
Committee and the performance of a sample of British organizations. Clearly, a wide 
range of results are observed. 
The first code was issued in 1978 in the United States, followed by Hong Kong, Ireland, 
the United Kingdom, and Canada. Today, more than sixty countries have drafted codes 
of good governance. Companies, as well as countries, seek to make their corporate 
governance practices more effective, in part as a consequence of corporate governance 
scandals, but also to attract investors (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009).  
The literature on codes of good governance has expanded a great deal since the Cadbury 
Report in the UK in 1992, and particularly since the early 2000s. Worldwide, codes 
provide a set of recommendations that listed companies should take into account when 
issuing their Annual Reports on Corporate Governance. Codes have some key universal 
principles for effective corporate governance that are common to most countries to 
achieve a balance between executive and non-executive directors, and a clear division 
of responsibilities between the chairman and the chief executive officer. 
The composition of the board therefore seems to be an important variable when 
considering whether the level of board independence, measured in terms of the 
percentage of external members, can create or destroy value in a company. Mínguez and 
Martin (2003: 18) cite empirical studies that obtained varying results
ii 
(no cases with a 
significant relationship, some with a positive effect, and others with a negative 
relationship). 
We therefore pose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Independence on the board enhances value creation 
Gender diversity and value creation  
Female representation in corporate decision-making is an important issue for 
policymakers all over the world (Terjesen, Sealy and Singh, 2009).  
Spain has published a Unified Good Governance Code of Listed Companies (CNMV, 
2006). Recommendation 15 states that "achieving adequate gender diversity on boards 
is not only a challenge in terms of ethics, politics and corporate social responsibility but 
is also an efficiency target that listed companies should at least consider in the medium 
term." It also raises the need for the percentage of women on the boards of Spanish 
listed companies to reach 40% by 2015 (De Anca, 2008). This Code outlines a 
supposedly economic definition stating that "wasting the potential entrepreneurial talent 
of women who represent 51% of the population does not make economic sense within 
the global context of large enterprises in our country”. 
Previous research has analyzed the relationship between diversity of corporate 
governance and value from multiple perspectives. Some authors consider that diversity 
allows for a better understanding of the market, increases creativity and innovation, and 
makes problem-solving more effective (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003; Esteban, 
2007). Bilimoria (2000) supports the argument that the presence of women not only 
improves the reputation of the company, but also improves its strategic management by 
bringing a more global view to the company. 
Other studies rely on agency theory to establish a link between board diversity and firm 
value. Fama and Jensen (1983) proposed that the board plays an important role as a 
mechanism to control and monitor managers. However, the results of published studies 
analyzing the relationship between gender diversity and value generation are not 
consistent. Carter et al (2003) concluded that this relationship is significant and positive 
for Fortune 1000 companies. Others researchers reached similar conclusions
iii
, 
confirming that there is a positive relationship between gender diversity on boards and 
greater financial performance (measured by Tobin's Q). Other authors,
iv
 however, point 
to a negative relationship. In summary, the economic case for board diversity and 
corporate governance can be related to the following proposition:  
Hypothesis 2: Gender diversity enhances value creation  
Family business and value creation 
According to Santana and Cabrera (2001), the boards of non-family-owned firms are 
significantly bigger than those of family-owned businesses and have the lowest 
proportion of board members involved in company management. Their empirical work 
expresses the idea that family firms seem to be at an advantage because of their lower 
proportion of agency conflicts. They also find a negative relationship between family 
ownership and the creation of value. Conelly, Limpaphayom and Nagarajan (2012) find 
a negative relationship between the existence of major family control and value 
creation. This may be because a greater presence of family members on the board 
implies a lower level of independence and this, in turn, is associated with a lower 
generation of value. 
Pukthuanthong, Walker and Nuttanontra (2013) find that family ownership helps to 
resolve agency conflicts between owners and management and enhances firm value. 
Using Tobin’s Q as a variable representing the greater presence of family members in 
managerial positions, these authors conclude that family-owned companies generate 
more value than non-family-owned companies. They also consider the effect of age to 
be a statistically significant and negative coefficient with respect to the generation of 
value.  
The results obtained by Cruz and Núñez (2011) show that European listed family-
owned businesses generated greater shareholder value over the period 2001-2010. 
Analysis of the possible effect of factors that could be affecting value creation (size, 
level of debt, risk and sectorial distribution) suggests the existence of a family effect 
that positively influences the creation of long-term shareholder value. We therefore 
propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3. Family business enhances value creation 
METHODOLOGY, DATA AND VARIABLES 
Sample and variables  
Our sample includes companies listed on the IBEX-35 for 2005-2012
v
. This choice is 
explained by the fact that companies necessarily have to be listed because of the value 
creation measures used in this work. In addition, according to Fernández, 
Aguirreamalloa and Corres (2011: 1), "trading volume of Ibex- 35 companies accounted 
for over 95% of trading on the continuous stock market" for the period 1991-2010.  
Dependent variable: Value Creation 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q ratio. This measure of value creation has been 
widely used in the recent literature (see Table 1). Alternatively, several studies, such as 
De los Ríos et al (2009), use Economic Value Added (hereinafter EVATM [1]) as a 
measure of value creation. However, a number of relevant caveats and potential 
problems have been claimed, related to the fact that this measure is static and based on 
accounting (Fernández, 2003). Hence we do not consider EVA and, instead, use as a 
measure of value creation an approximation of Tobin's Q, defined as the sum of the 
market value of stock and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total 
assets. 
TABLE 1 
Literature review for constructing q  as a proxy for firm value 
 Lang and 
Stulz 
(1994) 
Demsetz and 
Villalonga 
(2001) 
Mínguez 
and Martín 
(2003) 
Campbell 
and 
Mínguez-
Vera (2010) 
Lefort  
and Urzúa 
(2008) 
q: 
Tobin´s 
Q  
Market 
value of 
common 
stock and 
the book 
value of 
debt and 
preferred 
stock. / 
Book value 
of assets 
Market value of 
the firm / 
estimated 
replacement cost 
of the firm’s 
tangible assets 
Financial Q 
= Market 
value of 
common 
stock and the 
book value 
of debt 
/book value 
of assets 
Aproximatio
n of Tobin`s 
Q= Market 
value of 
stock and the 
book value 
of debt 
/book value 
of assets 
Market 
value of 
assets 
/book 
value of 
assets. 
 
Explanatory variables. Board structure is captured by four variables, which we call 
family, committee, independence and board. In preliminary estimates, some other 
variables were also included: the number and percentage of women on the board, CEO 
gender, and whether the chairman and CEO positions are held by the same person 
The number and percentage of women on the board were ruled out because of 
multicollinearity. CEO gender was also ruled out because it always takes zero. 
Consequently, we measured gender diversity as the committee variable, which takes the 
actual number of women on the board. We measured whether the chairman and CEO 
positions are held by the same person as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 when 
there is a single person in both positions, and zero otherwise. This variable was ruled 
out because, for this sample, it always takes zero. 
We also included the following three control variables: age, size, and ROA. The 
definitions of the variables are given in Table 2. In preliminary estimates, the ratio of 
total debt to total assets was also included but this gave rise to multicollinearity so it 
was dropped in the final estimate. A set of dummy variables was also included to 
control for the firm’s sector of activity, but a formal test clearly showed that they were 
redundant. 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Definition of explanatory variables 
 
 
Variable Definition Predicted 
sign 
Source 
Age Age of the firm - SABI 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets - SABI 
ROA Return on assets + SABI 
Family Dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if the firm is a family business 
and zero otherwise 
+/- SABI 
Committee Number of women members on 
different committees 
+/- CNMV 
Independent Percentage of independent board 
members 
+ CNMV 
Board Number of board members + CNMV 
 
The results of the papers that include these variables are described in table 2.  
Regarding the age variable, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2010) found this variable not 
significant. However, Mínguez Vera and López-Martínez (2010) and Pukthuantong, 
Walder and Nuttanontra (2013) found a negative and significant correlation with 
Tobin’s Q. Perhaps the explanation is that younger firms have future growth 
opportunities and a simpler organization. For this reason, we expect a negative relation 
with value creation. 
The results obtained by Carter et al (2010) for the size variable are not significant. 
However, most of the previous studies (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2010; Mínguez 
Vera and López-Martínez, 2010, and Vivel et al, 2013) obtained a negative and 
significant correlation with Tobin´s Q. We expect the same relationship because, like 
these authors, we considerthat smaller firms have a higher firm value. 
Relative to the ROA variable, we expect the firms that have a greater ROA also have a 
higher firm value, as shown in the results obtained by Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2010) and Vivel et al (2013). 
Table 3 shows that the relationship between family business and value creation takes 
different signs in the literature reviewed. However, most studies conclude that family 
ownership positively affects value creation. We believe that when a listed family-owned 
company qoted is very professionalized, it has less agency costs, and can generate more 
value. 
The committee variable is used as a proxy of gender diversity and measures the actual 
number of women on different committees. We expect a positive relation with value 
creation, because most of the studies on gender found this association. 
Lefort and Urzúa (2008) found that an increase in the proportion of outside directors 
positively affects value creation. However, Carter et al., (2010) found that the 
independent variable is not significant. We believe that independent directors can 
provide more resources to the firm and improve networking, positively affecting value 
creation. 
The literature review on board size obtained different results. Lefort and Urzúa (2008) 
found the board variable not significant. Yermack (1996) found an inverse relation 
between this variable and Tobin`s Q, and explained his result with agency theory. 
Conversely, Nicholson and Kiel (2007) and Jackling and Johl (2009) found a positive 
and significant relation. These authors base their results on the resource dependency 
theory, which argues that a greater number of directors provides more information for 
appropriate decision-making. In line with the latter study, we expect a positive 
association between the board variable and Tobin’s Q. 
 
TABLE 3. The effects of explanatory variables in previous studies
 
 
 
Variables 
used 
Authors Results Countries Years 
Age Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2010) 
No significant Spain 1989-2001 
Mínguez-Vera and López-
Martínez (2010) 
Significant and 
negative 
Spain 2008 
Pukthuanthong, Walder and 
Nuttanontra (2013) 
Significant and 
negative 
Canadá 1999-2007 
Size Carter et al., (2010) No significant United States 1998-2002 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2010) 
Significant and 
negative 
Spain 1989-2001 
Mínguez-Vera and López-
Martínez (2010) 
Significant and 
negative 
Spain 2008 
Vivel et al., (2013) Significant and 
negative 
Spain  2004-2007 
ROA Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2010) 
Significant and 
positive 
Spain 1989-2001 
Vivel et al., (2013) Significant and 
positive 
Spain  2004-2007 
Family Villalonga and Amit (2006) Significant and 
positive 
United States 1994-2000 
Barontini and Caprio (2006) No significant 11 european 
countries 
1999-2001 
Shyu (2011) Significant and 
positive 
Taiwan 2002-2006 
Cruz and Núñez (2011) Significant and 
positive 
26 european 
countries 
2001-2010 
Connelly, Limphayom and 
Nagarajan (2012) 
Significant and 
negative 
Thailand 2005 
Pukthuanthong, Walder and 
Nuttanontra (2013) 
Significant and 
positive 
Canadá 1999-2007 
Committee Carter et al., (2003) Significant and 
positive 
United States  1997 
Erhardt, Webel and Shrader 
(2003) 
Significant and 
positive 
United States 1993 and 1998 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2010) 
Significant and 
positive 
Spain 1989-2001 
Carter et al., (2010) Significant and 
positive 
United States 1998-2002 
Kochan et al., (2003) Significant and 
negative 
United States 1997 
Bohren and Strom (2010) Significant and 
negative 
Norway 1989-2002 
Rose (2007) No significant Denmark 1998-2001 
Independent Lefort and Urzúa (2008) Significant and 
positive 
Chile 2000-2003 
Carter et al., (2010) No significant United States 1998-2002 
Board Lefort and Urzúa (2008) No significant Chile 2000-2003 
Yermack (1996) Significant and 
negative 
United States 1984-1991 
Nicholson and Kiel (2007) Significant and 
positive 
Australia 2003-2005 
Jackling and Johl (2009) Significant and 
positive 
India 2005-2006 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Data, specification and econometric methodology 
The main descriptive statistics for all the variables are reported in Table 4. The 
corresponding Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were also computed in order to detect 
potential multicollinearity problems. They are shown in the last column. All variables  
meet the various recommendations for acceptable levels of VIF published in the 
literature (10, 5, or even 4).    
 
TABLE 4  
Descriptive statistics and VIF 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum VIF 
q 1.82 0.97 0.19 5.96  
q-1 1.90 0.99 0.19 5.96 2.15/2.51 
Age 2.52 1.06 1 4 1.49/1.52 
Size 15.85 1.45 13.59 19.93 2.10/3.83 
ROA 6.33 8.34 -20.70 42.09 1.82/1.76 
Family 0.40 0.9 0 1 1.33/1.22 
Committee 0.97 1.18 0 5 1.22/1.54 
Independent 0.40 0.19 0.06 0.89 2.00/3.62 
Board 14.24 3.25 7 21 1.62/2.15 
Notes: 160 observations for each variable. VIF values are reported for the whole period 
2005-2012 and for 2008-2012, respectively. 
Time-fixed effects are included in order to control for common shocks affecting firms, 
and OLS standard errors are replaced by robust SUR period errors. A formal test on 
redundant time-fixed effects confirmed their relevance
vi
. Moreover, addition of the 
lagged endogenous effect as a right-hand variable is required in order to deal with 
dynamic econometric problems. Once both the lagged endogenous and time-fixed 
effects are included, the Breusch-Godfrey test for first order autocorrelation clearly 
rules out problems in this connection, and then validates OLS estimates.   
In sum, the econometric specification finally estimated is the following: 
0 1 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
it it it it it
it it it it it
q q Age Size ROA
Family Committee Independent Board
    
    
         
        
 [1] 
Results 
The econometric results are summarised in Table 5. In column 1 the sample includes all 
available observations (160). In columns 2 and 3, the sample is split into two. While the 
first four-year period (2004-2008) coincides with the last phase of the recent economic 
boom in Spain, the second period (2009-2012) represents the depression years. This 
dramatic change in the economic scenario gives us the chance to check the determinants 
of firm performance under extreme and opposite conditions. 
 TABLE 5  
Econometric estimates of equation [1] 
Period 2005-2012 2005-2008 2009-2012 
Intercept 2.20*** 
(4.35) 
2.44*** 
(2.76) 
2.73*** 
(4.56) 
q-1 0.64*** 
(10.88) 
0.64*** 
(6.83) 
0.52*** 
(6.79) 
Age 0.045 
(1.25) 
0.089 
(1.28) 
0.0085 
(0.25) 
Size -0.13*** 
(3.67) 
-0.13** 
(2.31) 
-0.18*** 
(4.16) 
ROA 0.014** 
(2.48) 
0.022** 
(2.02) 
0.006 
(1.32) 
Family -0.026 
(0.40) 
-0.089 
(0.58) 
-0.073 
(1.13) 
Committee -0.0084 
(0.28) 
0.031 
(0.45) 
-0.041 
(1.32) 
Independent 0.31 
(1.11) 
0.25 
(0.54) 
0.84*** 
(2.65) 
Board 0.0098 
(0.71) 
-0.006 
(0.27) 
0.033** 
(2.33) 
R
2
 0.799 0.768 0.806 
Number of observations 160 80 80 
Notes: OLS estimates, including fixed-time effects.  
OLS standard errors are replaced by SUR period robust errors. 
In column 1, the statistically significant variables are the lagged endogenous Size and 
ROA variables. Smaller firms and those with higher ROA show higher Tobin’s Q values. 
This result is in line with Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2010). The Age variable is not 
result significant. This is in line with Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2010). However, 
this is not the case in Mínguez and López-Martínez (2010), where Age is significant and 
has a negative coefficient. 
Things are different when the two sub-samples are used. Both the lagged endogenous 
and Size variables remain relevant and with the same sign throughout both four-year 
periods. But ROA becomes statistically significant in the period 2005-2008, as in Vivel 
et al., (2013), and Independent and Board become relevant in the last column. Lefort 
and Urzúa (2008) also find that the Independent variable is not significant given that the 
period under study is 2000-2003, the pre-crisis period. The coefficient for these 
variables is positive. Value creation grows with both the share of independent board 
members and board size. This result supports the idea that the structure of boards is 
much more relevant in difficult and challenging times. Moreover, results are the same 
when the share of dominical counselors is used instead of the proportion of independent 
directors. The sign of the coefficient is the opposite: value drops with the share of 
dominical counselors in the board
vii
. Estimated coefficients in the last column of Table 5 
and ranks of both variables in Table 4 can be combined to get an idea of the impact of 
both variables on q
viii
. Ceteris paribus, the positive contemporaneous effect of 
Independent on q would range from 0.05 to 0.75; and the effect of Board from 0.26 to 
0.66. For this second period q ranged from 0.19 to 3.67 and the mean was 1.46. 
Finally, family ownership and the number of women on firms’ committees are not 
relevant to explain Tobin’s Q. Our result regarding family ownership differs from the 
result reached by Villalonga and Amit (2006), who obtain a positive relationship 
between family business and value creation. In contrast, it matches the result obtained 
by Barontini and Caprio (2006). Our interpretation of results is related to the fact that 
family-owned businesses move forward from one generation to another, with ownership 
and management growing apart, corporate governance becoming more professionalized 
and the differences between family and non-family businesses in terms of governance 
becoming non-existent. All the family businesses analyzed in this study are beyond the 
founding stage. Concerning the role of women, our results match with those by Carter et 
al., (2010), who also found the relationship between gender diversity and financial 
performance (measured via Tobin’s Q) to be neither positive nor negative. In our 
opinion, this last result can also be interpreted in more positive terms: measures to 
promote gender equality on boards have not involved paying a price in terms of value 
creation. 
DISCUSSION 
Our findings contribute to understanding of the link between corporate governance and 
value creation. They show that:  independence of directors has been relevant and 
involved a positive effect on the creation of value in the crisis period; gender diversity 
in corporate governance has no systematic or significant effect (either positive or 
negative) on value created; family ownership does not seem to exert a differential 
influence on value creation. 
Independence on boards 
Our results lead us to believe that current governance structures are not as efficient as 
they could be. It seems that restructuring companies would lead to greater generation of 
value. In recent years, many countries have drawn up codes of good governance for 
listed companies in an attempt to improve the way their governing bodies function 
(Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008), with most of them proposing that the number of 
independent directors be increased. Restructuring of boards to achieve greater 
professionalism and independence would lead to greater value creation. 
Therefore, according to Lei and Song (2012), companies that want to increase their 
value through corporate governance should reorganize their boards by giving them more 
independence. In line with this, empirical work concludes that in difficult times, the 
level of independence has had a positive effect on the creation of value.  
Gender diversity 
Previous studies analyzed how diversity in governance bodies affected the creation of 
value. Moreover, in recent years several countries have adopted different regulatory 
attempts to try to increase the number of women in corporate governance, both in the 
public and private arenas (Storvik and Teigen, 2010). In our research we analyze the 
presence of women in governing bodies, by measuring their presence in key committees 
and their impact on value creation in listed companies. Our results are neutral. No 
effect, either positive or negative, was observed in the generation of value has been 
observed. 
Family ownership 
The literature seems to reflect different results when it analyzes the effect of family 
character on value generation. In our paper, no effect (either positive or negative) on the 
value of firms is observed. The reason may lie in the fact that, given market demands, 
the companies under study listed on the main Spanish stock index are highly 
professionalized and, therefore, there are no differences in the way the board functions 
in respect to non-family-owned firms. Family-owned businesses that are beyond the 
founding stage, as is the case of all the family firms in our sample, separate the place for 
making business decisions (the board of directors) from the place for family decision-
making (by creating specific family structures such as a family board). 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Although its starting point is agency theory, complemented by resource dependence 
theory, the paper resorts to the sociological theory of the strength of weak ties 
(Granovetter,1973) to explain its results. Since a board consists of people with 
individual characteristics and different professional profiles, we believe that it is 
necessary to complement purely economic theories with behavior theories as these 
provide new perspectives. 
 
In mathematical sociology, interpersonal ties are defined as information-carrying 
connections between people. Interpersonal ties generally come in three varieties: strong, 
weak, or absent. It is argued that weak ties are more present in social networks, and are 
the ones that transmit most information through these networks. More specificall, new 
information flows to individuals through weak ties rather than through strong 
interpersonal ties. Absent ties correspond to relationships with no substantial meaning. 
“The strength of an interpersonal tie is a linear combination of the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which 
characterize each tie” (Granovetter, 1973: 1361). Weak ties act as bridges between both 
groups.In our case, the weak ties would be represented by independent directors (men or 
women) who represent a bridge between shareholders and executive members, and 
whose common goal is to be more efficient in decision-making.  
 
Practical implications 
 
This study leads to some conclusions that are relevant for business management. The 
observed results indicate that companies restructuring their boards could be 
recommended to move towards greater independence. This change in their composition 
would have a positive effect on the creation of value (according to Lei and Song, 2012). 
 
Our study seems to reflect that new regulations and codes of good governance are not 
having the desired effect: greater inclusion of women in relevant managerial positions. 
Norway is the only European country where parity has been accomplished (through 
punitive measures). Perhaps both Spanish and European institutions should reconsider 
the measures they have implemented, if they want to achieve real parity. 
 
According to the theory of the strength of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973), this is not just 
about increasing the number of independent directors, and the number of women. It also 
means that they must achieve a minimum percentage so they can exert an influence on 
corporate governance, and thus on value creation. 
 
Limitations and future research 
We are aware that this paper has some limitations. The first is that the work is focused 
on the analysis of listed companies in Spain alone. Future research should extend this 
study to other countries for the purpose of comparison. A comparative analysis between 
two blocs could also be considered: one made up of the nations most affected by the 
crisis (Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain), and the other of countries such as France, 
Germany and Britain.  
 
The second limitation concerns gender diversity. The presence of women in corporate 
governance in the companies analyzed is very small. It does not reach the minimum 
critical mass (of at least three women, according to Konrad, Dramer and Erkut, 2008) to 
be able to exert an effect on the generation of value. So perhaps our research should be 
repeated in the future within a context where a greater number of women enrolled in the 
highest management bodies is observed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results obtained may induce us to think that the current governance structures of 
listed companies are not the most efficient, and therefore restructuring them will allow 
for the generation of more value. There have been several attempts to improve the 
governing bodies of Spanish listed companies, with the publication of several reports 
and codes of good governance (CNMV, 1988, 2003, 2006). All of them recommend 
greater board independence. This paper analyzes the level of independence of the 
governing bodies of listed companies for the period 2005-2012. Empirical work shows 
that the greater the number of independent directors, the greater the value created. This 
impact is higher in times of crisis than in good times. In this case, independence is 
valued more than gender. Additionally, it appears that it is not only important to 
increase the number of independent directors, but it is also vital that this number should 
reach a minimum percentage to influence the board. 
In Spain in recent years, institutional and legislative efforts have attempted to increase 
the presence of women on the boards and committees of listed companies. Following 
these changes, it appears that in many cases women have been included on boards just 
to comply with the rule, regardless of efficiency. Proof of this is the fact that, in several 
companies, after publication of Law 3/2007 for Effective Equality between women and 
men, only one woman was included on the board and the critical mass cited by the 
literature of at least three women to exercise a certain impact on value creation was not 
reached. This study shows that gender diversity in the governing bodies of the Spanish 
companies listed on the IBEX-35 does no harm but has no positive effect either. This 
reflection should be taken with caution, given the small numerical presence of women 
in the companies under study. Policy and actions are planned to increase gender 
diversity in corporate governance by the year 2015. Future research could consider 
performing an additional analysis after this period.  
In this study, family ownership is not observed to have any effect on governance 
whatsoever. This may be because all of listed companies are highly professionalized. 
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NOTES 
 
i
 Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Esteban, 
2007; Lefort and Urzúa, 2008, De los Ríos, Jiménez, Valencia and Peralbo, 2009; Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera, 2010. 
ii
 Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Wiblin and Woo (1999) and Minguez and Martin (2003) find no 
significant relationship; Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) show a significant but negative relationship, while 
the results of Baysinger and Butler (1985), Barnhart; Marr and Rosenstein (1994) and Yermark (1996) 
point towards a conflicting significant and positive relationship. 
                                                                                                                                               
iii
 Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003) and Campbell and Minguez -Vera (2010), Carter et al., (2010 ) 
,Bilimoria (2000) and Esteban (2007). 
iv
 See, amongst others, Kochan, Bezrukova, Ely, Jackson, Joshi, Jehn, Leonard, Levine, and Thomas. 
(2003) and Bohren & Ström (2010). Rose (2007) states that there is no evidence of any relationship 
between the two variables on Danish boards due to the very tiny presence of women in leadership 
positions there. 
v
 In this paper, insurance companies, banks, and firms that were not listed during the research period were 
excluded. The 21 companies analyzed were the  following: Abertis, Abengoa, Acciona, Acerinox, ACS, 
Ebro Foods, Enagás, Endesa, FCC, Ferrovial, Gas Natural, Iberdrola, Indra, Mediaset, OHL, Red 
Eléctrica, Repsol, Sacyr, Telefónica, Viscofán. While Inditex was also included in preliminary estimates, 
, in the end it was discarded. 
vi
 We also tested, and rejected, the need for including individual fixed-effects. 
vii
 Insofar as both proportions are highly correlated, when both variables were observed at the same time, 
multicollinearity was troublesome. 
viii
 While the rank for Independent in the second four-year period is the same as in Table 6, the rank is 
slightly lower in the case of Board: 8-20 instead of 7-21. 
